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Abstract We introduce the WASABI1 Affect Simulation Architecture, in which a
virtual human’s cognitive reasoning capabilities are combined with simulated embod-
iment to achieve the simulation of primary and secondary emotions. In modeling pri-
mary emotions we follow the idea of “Core Affect” in combination with a continuous
progression of bodily feeling in three-dimensional emotion space (PAD space), that
is subsequently categorized into discrete emotions. In humans, primary emotions are
understood as onto-genetically earlier emotions, which directly influence facial expres-
sions. Secondary emotions, in contrast, afford the ability to reason about current events
in the light of experiences and expectations. By technically representing aspects of
each secondary emotion’s connotative meaning in PAD space, we not only assure their
mood-congruent elicitation, but also combine them with facial expressions, that are
concurrently driven by primary emotions. Results of an empirical study suggest that
human players in a card game scenario judge our virtual human MAX significantly
older when secondary emotions are simulated in addition to primary ones.
1 Introduction
Researchers in the field of embodied agents (Cassell, Sullivan, Prevost & Churchill
2000; Prendinger & Ishizuka 2004) build anthropomorphic systems, which are employed
in different interaction scenarios that afford communicative abilities of different style
and complexity. As these agents comprise an increasing number of sensors as well as
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2actuators together with an increase in expressive capabilities, they need to be able to
process social cues in face-to-face communication in order to fulfill a human attendee’s
expectations.
One factor in social interaction is the ability to deal with the affective dimension
appropriately. Therefore researchers in the growing field of “Affective Computing”
(Picard 1997) discuss ways to derive human affective states from various intrusive and
non-intrusive sensors. With regard to the expressive capabilities of embodied agents
the integration of emotional factors influencing bodily expressions is argued for. These
bodily expressions include, e.g., facial expression, body posture, and voice inflection and
all of them must be modulated in concert to synthesize coherent emotional behavior.
In this work, scientific inquiry and engineering are closely interwoven, by tak-
ing a cognitive modeling approach (building on both symbolic and dynamic system
paradigms). Creating an artificial system that reproduces certain aspects of a natural
system can help us understand internal mechanisms that lead to particular effects.
With the WASABI architecture we present our attempt to exploit different findings
and conceptions of emotion psychology, neurobiology, and developmental psychology in
a fully-implemented computational system. It is based on the simulation of an emotion
dynamics in three-dimensional emotion space, which has proven beneficial to increase
the lifelikeness and believability of our virtual human MAX in two different interaction
scenarios (Becker, Kopp & Wachsmuth 2007). With this emotion dynamics simulation,
however, we were limited to a class of rather simple emotions, that are similar to Dama-
sio’s conception of primary emotions. In the WASABI architecture we additionally use
our agent’s cognitive reasoning abilities to model the mood-congruent elicitation of
secondary emotions as well.
In the following section the psychological as well as neurobiological background is
described with respect to the distinction of primary and secondary emotions. Subse-
quently we give an overview of related work in the field of Affective Computing. The
WASABI architecture is presented in Section 3. We explain how nine primary emotions
together with three secondary emotions—namely the prospect-based emotions hope,
fears-confirmed, and relief—were integrated in such a way that their mood-congruent
elicitation can be guaranteed. We conclude by discussing results of a first empirical
study on the effect of secondary emotion simulation in a card game scenario.
2 Background and related work
We will first introduce the psychological and neurobiological background before an
overview of related work in affective computing is given.
2.1 Psychological and neurobiological background
Following the work of Scherer (1984) the psychological construct labeled emotion can
be broken up into the component of cognitive appraisal, the physiological component
of activation and Arousal, the component of motor expression, the motivational com-
ponent, and the component of subjective feeling state. We follow the distinction of a
cognitive appraisal component and a physiological component in our computational
3simulation of affect.2 We also account for the motivational component, because our
agent’s reasoning capabilities are modeled according to the belief-desire-intention ap-
proach to modeling rational behavior (Rao & Georgeff 1991). We further believe that
modeling the dynamic interaction between a cognitive and a physiological component is
a promising first step toward the goal of computationally realizing subjective feelings.
Recently, psychologists started to investigate “unconscious processes in emotions”
(Scherer 2005) and Ortony at al. discuss levels of processing in “effective functioning”
by introducing a distinction between “emotions” and “feelings” (Ortony, Norman &
Revelle 2005). They understand feelings as “readouts of the brain’s registration of
bodily conditions and changes” whereas “emotions are interpreted feelings” (Ortony
et al. 2005, p. 174) and propose three different levels of information processing, which
are compatible with Scherer’s three modes of representation (Scherer 2005).
According to Ortony and colleagues, lower levels have to contribute in order to
experience “hot” emotions such that “cold, rational anger” could be solely the product
of the cognitive component “without the concomitant feeling components from lower
levels.” (Ortony et al. 2005, p. 197) A purely primitive feeling of fear, on the con-
trary, also lacks the necessary cognitive elaboration to become a hot emotion. These
psychological considerations are compatible with LeDoux’s distinction of a low and a
high road of fear elicitation in the brain (LeDoux 1996) and Damasio’s assumption of
bodily responses causing an “emotional body state” (Damasio 1994, p. 138) that is
subsequently analyzed in the thought process.
Damasio distinguishes at least two classes of emotions, namely, primary and sec-
ondary emotions (Damasio 1994), on the basis of his neurobiological findings. They are
central to our simulation of affect and, thus, introduced next.
The class of “primary emotions” (Damasio 1994) are supposed to be innate. Ac-
cording to Damasio they developed during phylogeny to support fast and reactive
response behavior in case of immediate danger, i.e. basic behavioral response tenden-
cies like “flight-or-fight” behaviors. In humans, however, the perception of the changed
bodily state is combined with the object that initiated it resulting in a “feeling of
the emotion” with respect to that particular object (Damasio 1994, p. 132). Primary
emotions are also understood as prototypical emotion types which can already be as-
cribed to one-year-old children (Damasio 2003). Furthermore, they are comparable
to the concept of “Core Affect” (Feldman Barrett 2005; Russell & Feldmann Barrett
1999), which is based on the assumption that emotions cannot be identified by distinct
categories from the start. “Core Affect”, however, is represented in two-dimensional
emotion space of Pleasure/Valence and Arousal, which is sometimes extended by a
third dimension (Gehm & Scherer 1988; Russell & Mehrabian 1977) labeled “Con-
trol/Dominance/Power” of connotative meaning (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum 1957)
(as empirically shown by Mehrabian (1996), each PAD component can be related to
personality traits). Originally, Wundt claimed that any emotion can be characterized
as a continuous progression in such three-dimensional emotion space (Wundt 1863).
The three-dimensional abstract emotion space is commonly referred to as PAD space.
Secondary emotions like “relief” or “hope” are assumed to arise from higher cog-
nitive processes, based on an ability to evaluate preferences over outcomes and ex-
pectations. Accordingly, secondary emotions are acquired during onto-genesis through
learning processes in the social context. Damasio uses the adjective “secondary” to re-
2 The motor expression component has been realized as well, but is not discussed here
(cf. (Becker et al. 2007) for details).
4fer to “adult” emotions, which “utilize the machinery of primary emotions” (Damasio
1994, p. 137) by influencing the acquisition of “dispositional representations”, which
are necessary for the elicitation of secondary emotions. These acquired dispositional
representations, however, are believed to be different from the “innate dispositional
representations” underlying primary emotions. Furthermore, secondary emotions in-
fluence bodily expressions through the same mechanisms as do primary emotions.
2.2 Related work
El-Nasr, Yen & Ioerger (2000) present FLAME as a formalization of the dynamics of 14
emotions based on fuzzy logic rules that includes a mood value, which is continuously
calculated as the average of all emotion intensities to provide a solution to the problem
of conflicting emotions being activated at the same time. The idea of expectations is
realized in FLAME by means of learning algorithms based on rewards and punishments.
Although it was not integrated into the simulation of a virtual human, the mutual
influence of emotion and mood is quite similar to the conception of emotion dynamics
in the WASABI architecture.
Marsella & Gratch (2006) focus with their EMA model on the dynamics of emo-
tional appraisal. They also argue for a mood value as an addend in the calculation
of otherwise equally activated emotional states following the idea of mood-congruent
emotions. Their framework for modeling emotions is considered to be the first fully
implemented, domain-independent architecture for emotional conversational agents.
Marinier & Laird (2004) aim to combine the work of Marsella & Gratch (2006) with
the findings of Damasio (1994). In later publications (Marinier & Laird 2007), however,
Damasio’s work is less central and they follow the ideas of Scherer (2001). Their central
idea of “appraisal frames” is based on the EMA model (Marsella & Gratch 2006) and
eleven of Scherer’s sixteen appraisal dimensions are modeled for integration in the Soar
cognitive architecture. They distinguish an “Active Appraisal Frame”, which is the
result of a momentary appraisal of a given event, from a “Perceived Appraisal Frame”,
which results from the combination of the actual mood and emotion frames. Thereby,
they take Damasio’s distinction between emotion and feeling into account—similarly
to the conception underlying the WASABI architecture.
With their development of “Greta” Pelachaud & Bilvi (2003) are mainly concerned
with believability of conversational agents. To guarantee that Greta’s facial expres-
sions are always consistent with the situational context, de Rosis, Pelachaud, Poggi,
Carofiglio & de Carolis (2003) model Greta’s “mind” based on the BDI-approach.
This architecture’s emotion model builds upon a “Dynamic Belief Network”, which
integrates the time dimension in the representation of uncertainty of beliefs. Ochs,
Devooght, Sadek & Pelachaud (2006) present another BDI-based approach to imple-
ment OCC-based appraisal for Greta taking into account the socio-cultural context
and integrating a computational model of emotion blending for facial expressions. All
of these approaches to simulate emotions by means of BDI-based reasoning, however,
have difficulties to deal with temporal aspects of the dynamics of emotions, which is
central to our work.
Although Andre´, Klesen, Gebhard, Allen & Rist (1999) start by distinguishing
primary and secondary emotions, this idea is not taken up in their later publica-
tions (e.g. Gebhard, Klesen & Rist 2004). Gebhard (2005), recently, uses PAD space
5to derive a mood value from emotions resulting from OCC-based appraisal. Three-
dimensional emotion spaces similar to PAD space are also used to drive the socia-
ble robot “Kismet” (Breazeal 2003) and the humanoid robot WE-4RII (Itoh, Miwa,
Nukariya, Zecca, Takanobu, Roccella, Carrozza, Dario & Takanishi 2006).
3 The WASABI Architecture
The WASABI architecture conceptualized here builds upon previous work on the sim-
ulation of emotion dynamics for the virtual human MAX (Becker, Kopp & Wachsmuth
2004) that has proven to support the agent’s believability in two different interaction
scenarios (Becker et al. 2007; Becker-Asano, Kopp, Pfeiffer-Leßmann & Wachsmuth
2008). It was, however, limited to the simulation of primary emotions.
Accordingly, the WASABI architecture (Becker-Asano 2008) combines bodily emo-
tion dynamics with cognitive appraisal in order to simulate infant-like primary emotions
as well as cognitively elaborated (more adult) secondary emotions. In the following a
technically suitable specification of the different concepts emotion and mood is derived
from the theoretical background presented above.
Emotions are understood as current states with a specific quality and intensity,
which are the outcome of complex neurophysiological processes for communication.
The processes include neural activity of the brain as well as physiological responses
of the body. One gets aware of one’s emotions in two cases: (1) if their awareness
likelihood w exceeds a certain threshold (cf. Section 3.3) or (2) if one concentrates on
the underlying processes by means of introspection.
Emotions can be classified into primary and secondary ones, but every emotion has
either positive or negative valence of a certain value and compared to mood an emotion
lasts significantly less long. The differences between primary and secondary emotions
are conceptualized as follows:
– Secondary emotions are based on more complex data structures than primary ones.
Accordingly, only some general aspects of secondary emotions (such as their respec-
tive valence components) are represented in PAD space.
– The appraisal of secondary emotions depends much more on the situational context
and an agent’s memory than that of primary emotions. Thus, secondary emotions
are more dependent on the agent’s cognitive reasoning abilities.
– The releasers of secondary emotions might be learned based on the history of pri-
mary emotions in connection with memories of events, agents, and objects.
– The agent’s facial expressions of primary emotions (cf. Figure 1) may accompany
secondary emotions such that they do not necessarily need to be expressed by their
own set of facial expressions.
– Secondary emotions also modulate the agent’s simulated embodiment, such as its
general level of Arousal.
– The agent expresses its awareness of secondary emotions verbally.
Mood is modeled as a background state with a much simpler affective quality than
emotions. In contrast to the model of Gebhard (2005) mood is not derived from PAD
space, but modeled as an agent’s overall feeling of well-being on a bipolar scale of
positive versus negative valence already before a mapping into PAD space is achieved.
Any non-neutral mood is slowly regulated back to a neutral state of mood—much
6slower than it is the case for emotional valence. Accordingly, a mood’s duration is in
general longer than that of any emotion.
The described interconnectivity of mood and emotions results in an “emotion dy-
namics” (described in more detail in (Becker et al. 2007)), in which mood influences the
elicitation of emotions in such a way that mood-congruency of emotions is achieved.
This idea is empirically supported by Neumann, Seibt & Strack (2001), who found that
individuals in a positive mood are less likely to experience negative emotions and vice
versa.
3.1 Nine primary emotions
According to the above discussion, primary emotions (PE) are inborn affective states,
which are triggered by reflexes in case of potentially harmful stimuli. They result in
fast, reactive behavioral responses and, thus, are quite similar to the concept of proto-
affect proposed by (Ortony et al. 2005). According to developmental psychology, young
children express their (primary) emotions directly, because they did not yet internalize
this process as in the case of adults (Holodynski & Friedlmeier 2005).
In our previous realization of emotion dynamics (Becker et al. 2004) this direct
expression of primary emotions is achieved by implementing five of Ekman’s six “ba-
sic emotions” (Ekman, Friesen & Ancoli 1980). In addition, the emotions “bored”,
“annoyed”, and “depressed” as well as the non-emotional state “concentrated” are
simulated. Each of the primary emotions is located in PAD space according to Table 1,
for which the coordinates are derived from some of the values given in (Russell &
Mehrabian 1977, p. 286ff)3. Based on a distance metric in this emotion space they are
dynamically elicited concurrently to the agent’s cognition, which is also responsible for
triggering these emotions in such a way that their respective base intensities ipe are
temporarily set to 1.0 (see Section 3.3 for further details).
Table 1 Primary emotions in PAD space: The five “basic emotions” of Ekman (1999) are
assigned to the corresponding facial expressions modeled in (Becker et al. 2004) whenever such
a mapping is possible (cf. Figure 1) and additionally an individual base intensity ipe is set for
each primary emotion (see also Section 3.3)
Primary emotion Facial expr. (Ekman) PAD values base intensity ipe
1. angry anger (anger) (80, 80, 100) 0.75
2. annoyed sad (sadness) (-50, 0, 100) 0.75
3. bored bored (none) (0, -80, 100) 0.75
4. concentrated neutral (none) (0, 0, ±100) 0.75
5. depressed sad (sadness) (0, -80, -100) 0.75
6. fearful fear (fear) (-80, 80, 100) 0.25
7. happy happy (happiness) (80, 80, ±100)
(50, 0, ±100)
0.75
8. sad sad (sadness) (-50, 0, -100) 0.75
9. surprised surprised (surprise) (10, 80, ±100) 0.0
3 Although Russell & Mehrabian (1977) locate the emotion “bored” at a different point in
PAD space, we are confident that we might label an emotional state of very low arousal and
neutral valence with “bored” as well, because together with “depressed” it remains the only
one modeled to consist of low arousal.
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and the neutral state “concentrated” are shown in Figure 1. In case of high Pleasure
Ekman’s set of basic emotions only contains one obviously positive emotion, namely
happiness. Thus, in the WASABI architecture (Becker-Asano 2008) this primary emo-
tion covers the whole area of positive Pleasure regardless of Arousal or Dominance as
it is located in PAD space four times altogether.
Fig. 1 The nine primary emotions of Table 1 as points together with the three secondary
emotions of Table 2 as weighted areas in PAD space
3.2 Three secondary emotions
According to Damasio, the elicitation of secondary emotions involves a “thought pro-
cess”, in which the actual stimulus is evaluated against previously acquired experiences
and online generated expectations.
The “prospect-based emotions” cluster of the OCC model of emotions (Ortony,
Clore & Collins 1988) is considered here to belong to the class of secondary emotions,
because their appraisal process includes the evaluation of events against experiences
and expectations. This OCC cluster consists of six emotions (namely fear, hope, relief,
disappointment, satisfaction, and fears-confirmed), of which hope, fears-confirmed, and
relief are simulated in the WASABI architecture. The two secondary emotions dis-
appointment and satisfaction could be implemented similarly, but have not yet been
implemented in our demonstrator system due to time limitations.
The prospect-based emotion fear is obviously similar to the previously introduced
primary emotion fearful (cf. Table 1). This similarity is accounted for by assigning
a rather low base intensity of i6 = 0.25 to the emotion fearful, such that MAX is
8less likely to get aware of this primary emotion, if it has not been triggered by the
agent’s cognition, making fearful a more cognition-dependent primary emotion (see
also Section 4.1 for an example).
Table 2 The parameters of the secondary emotions hope, fears-confirmed, and relief for
representation as weighted areas in PAD space (cf. Figure 1)
Area (PAD values), intensity
HOPE
high Dominance (100, 0, 100), 0.6; (100, 100, 100), 1.0;
(-100, 100, 100), 0.5; (-100, 0, 100), 0.1
low Dominance (100, 0, -100), 0.6; (100, 100, -100), 1.0;
(-100, 100, -100), 0.5; (-100, 0, -100), 0.1
FEARS-CONFIRMED
low Dominance (-100, 100, -100), 1.0; (0, 100, -100), 0.0;
(0, -100, -100), 0.0; (-100, -100, -100), 1.0
RELIEF
high Dominance (100, 0, 100), 1.0; (100, 50, 100), 1.0;
(-100, 50, 100), 0.2; (-100, 0, 100), 0.2
low Dominance (100, 0, -100), 1.0; (100, 50, -100), 1.0;
(-100, 50, -100), 0.2; (-100, 0, -100), 0.2
3.2.1 Hope
Ortony et al. (1988) describe hope as resulting from the appraisal of a prospective
event. If the potential event is considered desirable for oneself, one is likely to be
“pleased about the prospect of a desirable event” (Ortony et al. 1988, p. 110). The
calculation of this emotion’s awareness likelihood, however, is rather independent from
these cognitive processes (see Section 3.3.2). This analysis provides the rationale for
representing hope in PAD space in the following way:
– Pleasure: An agent is more likely to get aware of hope the more pleasurable he feels.
– Arousal: With respect to an agent’s Arousal, hope is more likely elicited the higher
the agent’s Arousal value.
– Dominance: The awareness likelihood of hope is modeled to be independent of the
agent’s general level of Dominance.
To realize this distribution of awareness likelihood in case of hope two areas are intro-
duced in Figure 1: one in the high Dominance plane and the other in the low Dominance
plane. In Table 2 the exact values of the four corners of each of the two areas together
with the respective base intensities in each corner are given for hope.
3.2.2 Fears-confirmed
According to Ortony et al., fears-confirmed is elicited when being “displeased about
the confirmation of the prospect of an undesirable event.” (Ortony et al. 1988, p. 110)
With respect to its representation in PAD space the similarity to the primary emotion
fearful is taken into account and the following decisions are taken:
– Pleasure: The awareness likelihood of fears-confirmed increases the less pleasurable
the agent feels.
9– Arousal: fears-confirmed is assumed to be independent of the agent’s Arousal value.
– Dominance: fears-confirmed can only be perceived by the agent, when he feels
submissive as in the case of fearful.
This distribution of awareness likelihood is realized in PAD space (cf. Figure 1) by
introducing an area in the low Dominance plane (cf. Table 2 for the exact coordinates
and intensities).
3.2.3 Relief
The secondary emotion relief is described as being experienced whenever one is “pleased
about the disconfirmation of the prospect of an undesirable event.” (Ortony et al. 1988,
p. 110) Taking the similarity with Gehm and Scherer’s “content” cluster into account
Gehm & Scherer (1988), relief is represented in PAD space according to the following
considerations:
– Pleasure: relief is more likely to become aware the more pleasurable the agent feels.
– Arousal: Only in case of relatively low Arousal levels the agent is assumed to get
aware of the emotion relief.
– Dominance: The awareness likelihood of relief is considered to be independent from
the agent’s state of Dominance.
The awareness likelihood is represented in Figure 1 by two areas: one located in the
high Dominance plane and the other in the low Dominance plane (cf. Table 2).
3.3 Emotion dynamics and awareness likelihood
The implementation of emotion dynamics is based on the assumption that an organisms
natural, homeostatic state is characterized by emotional balance, which accompanies
an agent’s normal level of cognitive processing (Sloman, Chrisley & Scheutz 2005).
Whenever an emotionally relevant internal or external stimulus is detected, however,
its valence component serves as an emotional impulse, which disturbs the homeostasis
causing certain levels of Pleasure and Arousal in the emotion module. Furthermore, a
dynamic process is started by which these values are continuously driven back to the
state of balance (cf. (Becker et al. 2007) for details).
The two valences are mathematically mapped into PAD space (cf. Figure 1) and
combined with the actual level of Dominance, which is derived from the situational con-
text in the cognition of the architecture. This process results in a course of a reference
point in PAD space representing the continuously changing, bodily feeling state from
which the awareness likelihoods of primary and secondary emotions are incessantly
derived (see also Becker-Asano et al. 2008).
3.3.1 Awareness likelihood of primary emotions
The awareness likelihood of any of the nine primary emotions pe (cf. Table 1) depends
on the distance between the actual PAD values and each primary emotion’s PAD
values (i.e. dpe in Equation 1) with a smaller distance resulting in a higher awareness
likelihood. When dpe falls below Φpe units for a particular primary emotion pe, the
calculation of its awareness likelihood wpe is started according to Equation 1 until dpe
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falls below ∆pe units in which case the likelihood wpe equals the primary emotion’s
base intensity ipe.
wpe = (1−
dpe −∆pe
Φpe −∆pe
) · ipe, with Φpe > ∆pe ∀pe ∈ {pe1, . . . , pe9} (1)
In Equation 1, Φpe can be interpreted as the activation threshold and ∆pe as the satu-
ration threshold, which can be adjusted for every primary emotion pen ∈ {pe1, . . . , pe9}
independently4. By setting a primary emotion’s base intensity ipe to 0.0 (as in the case
of surprised, cf. Table 1) it needs to be triggered by the cognition before it might gain
a non-zero awareness likelihood wpe.
In case of primary emotions that are represented in PAD space more than once
(i.e. concentrated, happy, and surprised; cf. Table 1) the representation with the min-
imum distance to the reference point is considered in Equation 1 for calculation of its
awareness likelihood.
3.3.2 Awareness likelihood of secondary emotions
With representing the three secondary emotions in PAD space their mood-congruent
elicitation can be assured, because the actual PAD values are also relevant for cal-
culating every secondary emotion’s awareness likelihood. In contrast to most primary
emotions, all secondary emotions’ base intensities are set to zero by default (as in case
of surprised, cf. Table 1). Accordingly, every secondary emotion needs to be triggered
by a cognitive process, before it gains the potential to get aware to the agent. Further-
more, a secondary emotion’s lifetime parameter (set to 10.0 by default) together with
its decay function (set to linear by default) are used to decrease its intensity over time
until its base intensity of zero is reached again. As secondary emotions are represented
in PAD space by four sided polygons (cf. Table 2) with separate intensities per vertex
(i.e. corner), linear interpolation is used to calculate a secondary emotion’s awareness
likelihood (cf. (Becker-Asano 2008) for details).
3.4 Connecting cognition and embodiment
In Figure 2 the conceptual distinction of an agent’s simulated embodiment and its
cognition is presented and the different modules and components of the WASABI
architecture are assigned to the corresponding layers.
To the left of Figure 2 the virtual human MAX perceives some (internal or exter-
nal) stimulus. Non-conscious appraisal is realized by directly sending a small positive
emotional impulse to the Emotion dynamics. This establishes the “low road” (LeDoux
1996) of primary emotion elicitation. For example, the presence of visitors in the mu-
seum (Becker et al. 2004) is interpreted as intrinsically pleasant following the ideas of
Scherer (2001).
Another path resulting in emotional impulses begins with conscious appraisal of
the perceived stimulus (cf. Figure 2, top left). This process resides in the Cognition,
because it is based on the evaluation of goal-conduciveness of an event (Scherer 2001)
and can be considered the “high road” of emotion elicitation (LeDoux 1996). Therefore,
MAX exploits his BDI-based cognitive reasoning abilities to update his memory and
4 The nine primary emotions are indexed according to Table 1 on page 6.
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Fig. 2 The conceptual distinction of cognition and embodiment in the WASABI architec-
ture. Any perceived stimulus is appraised by conscious and non-conscious processes in parallel
leading to the elicitation of “emotional impulses”. These drive the “emotion dynamics”, which
is part of the agent’s virtual embodiment and from which mood, Pleasure, and Arousal are
continuously derived. PAD space is used (1) to directly elicit primary emotions with a certain
intensity and (2) to act as an “awareness filter”, which ensures mood-congruency of both pri-
mary and secondary emotions. The resulting set of “aware emotions” are finally reappraised
in the cognition before giving rise to deliberative actions.)
generate expectations. These deliberative processes not only enable MAX to derive his
subjective level of Dominance from the situational and social context, but also propose
cognitively plausible secondary emotions.
These secondary emotions are, however, first filtered in PAD space, before MAX
might get aware of them (cf. Figure 2, middle). Independent of this “awareness filter”,
every cognitively plausible secondary emotion influences the Emotion dynamics com-
ponent of the WASABI architecture, thereby modulating MAX’s Pleasure and Arousal
values, i.e. his simulated Embodiment. This influence is achieved by interpreting the va-
lence component of any secondary emotion as an emotional impulse (cf. Figure 2, left).
This way, secondary emotions “utilize the machinery of primary emotions” (Damasio
1994, p. 137), because they might result in the elicitation of mood-congruent primary
emotions, which—in the WASABI architecture—drive MAX’s facial expressions invol-
untarily. Furthermore, as the Pleasure and Arousal values are incessantly modulating
MAX’s involuntary behaviors (i.e. breathing and eye blinking) as well, even “unaware”
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secondary emotions have an effect on MAX’s bodily state, which is expressed by these
behaviors.
In combination with the actual level of Dominance, primary emotions are elicited
by means of a distance metric in PAD space. As mentioned before, these primary
emotions are directly driving MAX’s facial expressions. Although this automatism
might be considered unnatural for an adult, it has proven applicable and believable in
the situational contexts in which MAX was integrated so far.
After the awareness filter has been applied, the resulting set of aware emotions
consists of primary and secondary emotions, which have positive awareness likelihoods
in that moment of the interaction. They are finally subject to further deliberation and
reappraisal resulting in different coping behaviors (cf. Becker et al. 2007).
4 Application in the Skip-Bo scenario and first empirical evidence
The WASABI architecture was successfully used to extend the cognitive capabilities of
MAX in the previously implemented Skip-Bo card game scenario (Becker, Prendinger,
Ishizuka & Wachsmuth 2005; Prendinger, Becker & Ishizuka 2006). In this section its
technical realization along an exemplary interaction are described and details of an
empirical study are given, which yields promising results with regard to the effect of
secondary emotion simulation.
4.1 Technical realization and example of an interaction
The virtual human MAX is based an a multi-agent system that enables us to encapsu-
late his cognitive abilities by devising specialized software agents (see Figure 3). They
communicate with each other by passing messages.
Fig. 3 The three most important software agents in the Skip-Bo scenario and their intercon-
nection by means of message passing. Conceptually, the BDI-Agent realizes the cognition of
MAX whereas his embodiment is simulated by two other software agents (cf. Figure 2)
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The author’s emotion dynamics simulation system is implemented as a so-called
Emotion-Agent and acts in concert with a number of other agents (see Figure 3;
cf. (Becker 2003; Becker-Asano 2008) for details). In the Skip-Bo scenario the Emotion-
Agent receives emotional impulses from the BDI-Agent, which is continuously being
updated with awareness likelihoods of primary and secondary emotions. The reasoning
processes within the BDI-Agent also derive the actual state of Dominance from the
context of the card game, such that MAX feels dominant whenever it is his turn and
non-dominant, i.e. submissive, otherwise. Thus, whenever the human opponent fails to
follow the rules of the game, MAX takes the turn to correct her and accordingly feels
dominant until giving the turn back to the human. Concurrently, the BDI-Agent keeps
the Visualization-Agent updated about the actual primary emotions and PAD values.
Fig. 4 Sequence diagram of an information flow between the software agents with the time-line
from top to bottom
The sequence diagram in Figure 4 illustrates an example information flow within the
WASABI architecture. The three agents BDI-Agent, Emotion-Agent, and Visualization-
Agent (“Vis.-Agent”) are represented as boxes in the top of Figure 4. In the top-left
box, labeled BDI-Agent, the three plans generate-expectation (“gen. exp.”), check expec-
tations (“check exp.”), and react-to-secondary-emotion (“react sec.”) are rendered as
three white rectangles to show their activity below5. The same rectangles are used to de-
pict the PAD space as well as the emotions fearful and Fears-Confirmed (“Fears-Conf.”)
which all reside in the Emotion-Agent. The internal realization of the Visualization-
Agent is not detailed here. In this example it only receives messages from the other
agents, although in reality it also distributes information about the human player’s
interaction with the game interface by sending messages to the BDI-Agent (see Fig. 3).
5 Pseudo-code representations as well as detailed descriptions of all BDI-plans can be found
in (Becker-Asano 2008).
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An exemplary sequence of message communication of these agents is shown in
Figure 4 with the time-line from top to bottom. At first, the generate-expectation
plan is called, e.g., after MAX played his last card. This plan, first, sends a negative
impulse (“send impulse neg.”) to the Emotion-Agent thereby indirectly changing
MAX’s emotional state in PAD space (cf. Section 3.3). Subsequently, while following
the same plan, the primary emotion fearful is being triggered (“trigger fearful”) by
the BDI-Agent, because MAX expects the human player to play an important card.
In the Emotion-Agent, however, the negative emotional impulse pushed the refer-
ence point in PAD space already close enough to the (not yet triggered) emotion fearful
to let MAX experience fear with low intensity, because fearful has a slightly positive
base intensity of 0.25 (cf. Table 1). In Figure 4 this non-zero standard intensity of
fearful is indicated by a small double line along the dashed, vertical lifeline of fear-
ful. Accordingly, “slightly fearful” is sent to the Visualization-Agent even before the
BDI-Agent triggers the emotion fearful. Because the intensity of fearful in the Emotion-
Agent abruptly changes with the incoming trigger fearful message, MAX’s emotional
state changes from slightly fearful to very fearful. This sudden change in intensity is
reproduced in Figure 4 by the two gray triangles drawn along each emotion’s lifelines
and leads to a clear expression of fear in MAX’s face as shown in Figure 5(a).
The intensity of fearful decreases within the next ten seconds and the reference
point changes its location in PAD space due to the implemented emotion dynamics.
Thus, very fearful automatically changes to fearful (see right side of Figure 4) without
any further impulse or trigger messages.
Next, the check expectations plan is activated in the BDI-Agent to check, if a hu-
man player’s action meets the previously generated expectations. In this example, the
BDI-Agent, first, sends a negative impulse to the Emotion-Agent, thereby changing the
reference point’s location in PAD space such that MAX gets very fearful again. This
sequence of different emotion intensities (slightly fearful, very fearful, fearful, very fear-
ful) is possible for every primary or secondary emotion, although it is exemplified only
for fearful in Figure 4. It results from the dynamic interplay of lower-level emotional
impulses and higher-level (cognitively triggered) changes of an emotion’s base intensity.
The check expectations plan then triggers the secondary emotion Fears-Confirmed
(“trigger Fears-Conf.”) in the Emotion-Agent, thereby maximizing its base inten-
sity. Together with the negatively valenced mood, fears-confirmed acquires a non-zero
awareness likelihood, which is sent back to the BDI-Agent (“send Fears-Conf.”). The
plan react-to-secondary-emotion is then executed to process the incoming message and
results in an “utter Fears-Conf.” message, which is sent to the Visualization-Agent
letting MAX produce an appropriate utterance (cf. Figure 5(b)).
A human opponent would possibly give the following description of this sequence6:
After MAX ended his turn with playing a hand card to one of his stock
piles, he seemed to realize within one or two seconds that I could now directly
play one of my four stock pile cards, because his facial expression changed
to fearful and he seemed to inhale sharply, which produced the characteristic
sound of someone being afraid. When I then actually played that stock card,
MAX admitted that he had been afraid of that before.
6 A video of this and similar interactions is available for download at http://www.becker-
asano.de/WASABI MaxInCave Page.avi.
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(a) MAX fears that the human might play
his stock pile card next and displays a fearful
facial expression.
(b) MAX realizes that his fears just got
confirmed and utters “Das hatte ich schon
befu¨rchtet!” (I was afraid of that!)
Fig. 5 MAX first fearing the human player to play a card and then seeing his fears confirmed
Similar dynamic interplays between conscious appraisals and bodily feelings are realized
within the Skip-Bo scenario for the secondary emotions relief and hope as well (cf.
Becker-Asano 2008).
4.2 Empirical evidence on the effect of secondary emotion simulation
Although our approach has not been subject to extended evaluation, some empirical
evidence on the effect of secondary emotion simulation could already be gathered7.
We derived the following hypothesis from the psychological findings presented in Sec-
tion 2.1.
Hypothesis MAX expressing primary and secondary emotions is judged older
than MAX expressing only primary emotions.
As discussed in Section 2.1, secondary emotions are understood to be the product of
ontogenetical development and children are less able to suppress their emotional expres-
sions than adults. Accordingly, humans playing Skip-Bo against MAX with secondary
emotions (i.e., driven by the WASABI architecture) should be expected to judge him
older than those humans that play against a version of MAX which only simulates
and directly expresses primary emotions (i.e., driven by the original emotion dynamics
system of Becker (2003); cf. (Becker et al. 2004)).
4.2.1 Design
To test the above hypothesis the following two conditions8 were designed:
7 We can only present a summary of the empirical study here, but a detailed description
can be found in (Becker-Asano 2008).
8 Notably, the number of verbal utterances performed by MAX is likely to be higher in
condition (2) than in condition (1). This difference, however, adds to the impression of MAX
16
(1) Only primary emotions condition: The emotion simulation is constrained to pri-
mary emotions and MAX expresses them directly by means of facial expressions
and “affective sounds”. He appraises the actions of the human player negatively
and his own progress in the game positively. During his turn and while correcting
a human’s mistake he feels dominant, otherwise submissive (i.e. non-dominant).
(2) Primary and secondary emotions condition: Secondary emotions are simulated in
addition to the setup of condition (1) and MAX expresses them verbally in case of
positive awareness likelihood (cf. Section 4.1).
In order to model condition (1) the WASABI architecture is initialized such that:
– The three secondary emotions hope, fears-confirmed, and relief are not included.
– Every primary emotion has the same saturation threshold ∆pe (0.2), activation
threshold Φpe (0.64), and base intensity (1.0).
In effect, the simpler emotion simulation system of Becker (2003) is reproduced within
the WASABI architecture for condition (1).
To realize condition (2) the emotion module is initialized according to Tables 1 and
2 (cf. Section 3.1, page 6ff.). Furthermore, for surprised the saturation threshold ∆9 is
set to 0.3 in order to increase the probability of MAX getting aware of his surprise,
after this primary emotion was triggered by the cognition (cf. (Becker-Asano 2008) for
details)9.
4.2.2 Participants
Fourteen male and nine female university students voluntarily took part in the study
and all but one of them were German. Their age ranged from 13 to 36 years and
the average age was 23 years. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions
resulting in a total of 11 participants (six male and five female) for condition (1) and
12 participants (eight male and four female) for condition (2).
4.2.3 Procedure
Participants received written instructions of the card game (in German) with a screen-
shot of the starting condition and got the chance to ask clarifying questions about
the gameplay before they entered a room with a three-sided large-screen projection
system. Participants entered the room individually and were equipped with goggles for
3D viewing and a marker for the right hand. They were briefed about the experiment,
in particular that they would play a competitive game. Then, the participants played
a short introductory game against a non-emotional MAX, which allowed them to get
used to the interface, and also gave them the chance to ask clarifying questions about
the game. Each participant won this first game easily.
From now on, the experimenter remained visually separated from the participant
only to supervise the experiment. After the game was reset manually, MAX welcomed
as a less child-like interaction partner in condition (2), because young children are also less
good at expressing their feelings verbally.
9 Surprised is the only primary emotion with a base intensity of 0.0 (cf. Table 1) such that
it can only get aware to the agent after being triggered by the cognition. This is based on the
assumption that surprised is only expressed in reaction to unexpected events and expectedness
of events is checked within the BDI-Agent, i.e. the agent’s cognition.
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the participant verbally and asked him or her to play the first card. After the game
was completed, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire in German presented
on the screen of another computer in a room next door.
This questionnaire contained a total of 26 questions, of which 25 had already been
asked in Japanese to the participants of a similar study in Japan (cf. (Prendinger et al.
2006)). To falsify our hypothesis we additionally asked the following question:
If MAX were a real human, how old would you judge him to be?
The participants were asked to fill in MAX’s suspected age in years in a blank behind
this question.
4.2.4 Results
The two mean values and standard deviations of the participants’ answers to the above
question are presented in Figure 6(a). In the primary emotions only condition (1) MAX
was judged to be significantly younger (mean value 19.8 years, standard deviation 7.7)
than in condition (2), in which secondary emotions were simulated as well (mean value
27.5, standard deviation 7.5). A two-tailed t-test assuming unequal variances results
in p = 0.025.
(a) Between primary emotions only condition
(1) and primary and secondary emotions con-
dition (2) a significant difference occurred
(b) No gender-related effects were observed
with regard to question 17b
Fig. 6 Mean values and standard deviations of the answers to question number 17b “If MAX
were a real human, how old would you judge him to be?”
Because male and female participants were not evenly distributed among the two
conditions (cf. Section 4.2.2), the answers of all nine female participants were compared
to the answers of all 14 male participants regardless of the experimental condition. The
mean values of these two groups did not differ significantly (cf. Figure 6(b)) letting us
assume that no gender effects occurred. This result strengthens the supposition that
the between-conditions difference can be interpreted to confirm the initial hypothesis.
5 Discussion and conclusion
We presented the WASABI architecture for mood-congruent simulation of primary
and secondary emotions as it is integrated in, and makes use of, the overall cogni-
tive architecture of the virtual human MAX. The simulation and direct expression
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of primary emotions is based on the idea to capture an agent’s bodily feeling as a
continuous progression in three-dimensional emotion space (i.e. PAD space), which is
subsequently translated into weighted, primary emotions. Secondary emotions, in con-
trast, are understood as a class of emotions that require higher cognitive reasoning
abilities and a certain sense of time, in that an agent has to be able to take experiences
and expectations into account to generate prospect-based, secondary emotions. To also
assure mood-congruency of secondary emotions, we capture aspects of their connota-
tive meanings in PAD space as well by introducing weighted areas. Furthermore, to
account for the decisive influence of cognitive processes in the elicitation of secondary
emotions, they can gain a certain awareness likelihood in PAD space of the agent’s
virtual embodiment, only after having been triggered by cognitive processes.
The simulation of secondary emotions was exemplified by integrating three prospect-
based emotions into the WASABI architecture. We believe, however, that other high-
level, secondary emotions could be simulated similarly.
Finally, we reported on an empirical study conducted to answer a question derived
from developmental psychology, namely, if the additional simulation of secondary emo-
tions lets our virtual human MAX appear older within a playful interaction. Although
the results of this study can be interpreted affirmatively, we acknowledge that the differ-
ence in MAX’s use of spoken language between conditions may have compromised the
results. Independent thereof, the practical applicability of the WASABI architecture
to a well-defined, playful interaction scenario was demonstrated successfully.
In conclusion, we believe that the WASABI architecture is a helpful model to
understand how the dynamic interplay of body and mind together with past experiences
and future expectations sometimes turns “cold” cognitions into “hot” affective states.
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